This chapter is an attempt to interpret recent rapid Chinese growth in a longer term perspective.
treatment (instant deregulation of most prices and introduction of convertibility of dong) even before Poland did, in 1989, and still managed to avoid the reduction of output 2 . Third, differing performance of the former Soviet Union (FSU) states. The champions of liberalization and stabilization in the region were definitely Baltic states (cumulative liberalization index by 1995 -2.4-2.9), whereas Uzbekistan (with the same index of 1.1) is commonly perceived to be one of the worst procrastinators. But in Uzbekistan the reduction of output in 1990-95 totaled only 18%
and the economy started to grow again in 1996, while in the Baltics output fell in the early 1990s
by 36-60% and even in 1996, two years after the bottom of the recession was reached, was still 31% to 58% below the pre-recession maximum. In [2004] [2005] , the list of countries that exceeded the pre-recession level of output in 1989 looked very much like a list of procrastinators in terms of economic liberalization and non-democratic regimes in terms of political liberalization: in addition to 5 central European countries and Estonia, there were also Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus and Kazakhstan (see fig. 1 , 2) 3 , not to speak about China and Vietnam. Thus, the case for gradual, Chinese-type reforms remains very strong and is very much favored by many academics and policy makers (see Kolodko (2000) for an extensive summary of the debate).
. While Vietnamese industry, excluding constantly and rapidly growing oil production, experienced some downturn in 1989-90 (-6% in 1989 and 0% in 1990) agricultural growth remained strong, so that GDP growth rates virtually did not fall (5-6% a year). 
Reasons for differing performance during transition: initial conditions
My own research that compares the performance of 28 post-communist economies (including China and Vietnam) during transition (Popov, 2000 (Popov, , 2007 points out to the following factors of differing performance.
In the first approximation, economic recession that occurred during transition was associated with the need to reallocate resources in order to correct the industrial structure inherited from centrally planned economy (CPE). These distortions include over-militarization and overindustrialization (resulting in the underdevelopment of the service sector), perverted trade flows among former Soviet republics and Comecon countries, excessively large size and poor specialization of industrial enterprises and agricultural farms (lack of small enterprises and farms). In most cases these distortions were more pronounced in former Soviet Union countries (FSU) than in Eastern Europe (EE), not to speak about China and Vietnam, -the larger the distortions, the greater was the reduction of output ( fig. 4 ). Transformational recession, to put in economic terms, was caused by adverse supply shock similar to the one experienced by Western countries after the oil price hikes in 1973 and 1979 , and similar to post-war recessions caused by conversion of the defense industries. Note that the magnitude of the reduction of output during the transformational recession is determined by the size of pre-transition distortions only under shock therapy type instant deregulation of prices. Consider a country where deregulation of prices (or elimination of trade tariffs/subsidies) leads to a change in relative price ratios and thus produces an adverse supply shock for at least some industries. Capital and labor should be reallocated from industries facing declining relative prices and profitability to industries with rising relative prices. If reforms are carried out instantly, then output in the unprofitable sector falls immediately and savings for investment are generated only by the competitive sector, so that it takes a number of years to reach the pre-recession level of output. However, assume that reforms are carried out slowly (gradual price deregulation or elimination of tariffs/subsidies), so that every year output in the non-competitive sector falls not completely, but at a natural rate, i.e. as its fixed capital stock retires in the absence of new investment. In this case it would be possible to avoid the reduction of total output because the decline of the non-competitive sector would be overcompensated by the growth of the competitive sector.
The example illustrates that there is a limit to the speed of reallocating capital from noncompetitive to competitive industries, which is determined basically by the net investment/GDP ratio (gross investment minus retirement of capital stock in the competitive industries, since in non-competitive industries the retiring capital stock should not be replaced anyway). It is not reasonable to wipe away output in non-competitive industries faster than capital is being transferred to more efficient industries.
Market type reforms in many post-communist economies created exactly this kind of a bottleneck. Countries that followed shock therapy path found themselves in a supply-side recession that is likely to become a textbook example: an excessive speed of change in relative prices required the magnitude of restructuring that was simply non-achievable with the limited pool of investment. Up to half of their economies was made non-competitive overnight, output in these non-competitive industries was falling for several years and fell in some cases to virtually zero, whereas the growth of output in competitive industries was constrained, among other factors, by the limited investment potential and was not enough to compensate for the output loss in the inefficient sectors (Popov, 2000) . The reduction of output in Russian industries was higher in industries that experience the greatest deterioration of their terms of trade ( fig. 5) . Ratio of 1998 proices to 1990 prices as a % of industrial average January 1998 output as a % of Hence, at least one general conclusion from the study of the experience of transition economies appears to be relevant for the reform process in all countries: provided that reforms create a need for restructuring (reallocation of resources), the speed of reforms should be such that the magnitude of required restructuring does not exceed the investment potential of the economy. In short, the speed of adjustment and restructuring in every economy is limited, if only due to the limited investment potential needed to reallocate capital stock. This is the main rationale for gradual, rather than instant, phasing out of tariff and non-tariff barriers, of subsidies and other forms of government support of particular sectors (it took nearly 10 years for the European Economic Community or for NAFTA to abolish tariffs). This is a powerful argument against shock therapy, especially when reforms involved result in a sizable reallocation of resources. For Western countries with low trade barriers, low subsidies, low degree of price controls, etc. even fast, radical reforms are not likely to require restructuring that would exceed the limit of investment potential. But for less developed countries with a lot of distortions in their economies supported by explicit and implicit subsidies, fast removal of these subsidies could easily result in such a need for restructuring that is beyond the ability of the economy due to investment and other constraints.
Such a reduction of output due to the inability of the economy to adjust rapidly to new price ratios is by no means inevitable, if deregulation of prices proceeds gradually (or if losses from deteriorating terms of trade for most affected industries are compensated by subsidies). The pace of liberalization had to be no faster than the ability of the economy to move resources from noncompetitive (under the new market price ratios) to competitive industries. 
Reasons for differing performance during transition: institutional capacity
The additional reason for the extreme depth and length of the transformational recession was associated with the institutional collapse -here differences between EE countries and China on the one hand and FSU on the other hand are striking. The efficiency of state institutions, understood as the ability of the state to enforce its own rules and regulations, resulted in the inability of the state to perform its traditional functions -to collect taxes and to constraint the shadow economy, to ensure property and contract rights and law and order in general (crime rates and corruption increased dramatically during transition as compared to the communist past). Naturally, poor ability to enforce rules and regulations did not create business climate conducive to growth and resulted in the increased costs for companies. The decline in the share of government revenues in GDP is strongly correlated to the dynamics of output during transition ( fig. 6 ). It is precisely this strong institutional framework that should be held responsible for both -for the success of gradual reforms in China and shock therapy in Vietnam, where strong authoritarian regimes were preserved and CPE institutions were not dismantled before new market institutions were created; and for the relative success of radical reforms in EE countries, especially in Central European countries, where strong democratic regimes and new market institutions emerged quickly. And it is precisely the collapse of strong state institutions that started in the USSR in the late 1980s and continued in the successor states in the 1990s that explains the extreme length, if not the extreme depth of the FSU transformational recession.
Three major patterns of change in the share of government expenditure in GDP 4 , which generally coincide with the three major archetypes of institutional developments, and even broader -with three most typical distinct "models" of transition, are shown in fig. 7 . Under strong authoritarian regimes (China) cuts in government expenditure occurred at the expense of defense, subsidies and budgetary financed investment, while expenditure for "ordinary government" as a percentage of GDP remained largely unchanged (Naughton, 1997) ; under strong democratic regimes (Poland) budgetary expenditure, including those for "ordinary government", declined only in the pre-transition period, but increased during transition itself;
finally, under week democratic regimes (Russia) the reduction of the general level of government expenditure led not only to the decline in the financing of defense, investment and subsidies, but to the downsizing of "ordinary government", which undermined and in many instances even led to the collapse of the institutional capacities of the state. While in China total budgetary expenditure and that for "ordinary government" are much lower than in Russia and Poland, they were sufficient to preserve the functioning institutions since the financing of social security from the government budget was traditionally low. In Russia, however, though expenditure for ordinary government seem to be not that much lower than in Poland, the pace of their reduction during transition exceeded that of GDP: to put it differently,
given the various patterns of GDP dynamics, while in Poland "ordinary government" financing grew by about one third in real terms in 1989-95/6 (and while in China it nearly doubled), in
Russia it fell by about 2/3! The Russian pattern of institutional decay proved to be extremely detrimental for investment, and for general economic performance. Crime was rising gradually in the Soviet Union since the mid 1960s, but after the collapse of the USSR there was an unprecedented surge -in just several years in the early 1990s crime and murder rates doubled and reached one of the highest levels in the world ( fig. 8 ) 5 . By the mid 1990s the murder rate stood at over 30 people per 100,000 of inhabitants against 1-2 persons in i.e. lower than Western estimates, which is likely to lead to overstatement of spending for investment and subsidies at the expense of defense outlays. For USSR/Russia investment and subsidies are shown together. 5 Crime statistics is usually perceived to be incomparable in different countries because of large variations in the percentage of registered crimes. But murders are registered quite accurately by both criminal statistics and death (demographic) statistics. The first one is more restrictive than the second one, since it registers only illegal murders, whereas the second one -all murders, including "legal" (capital punishment and "collateral damage" during wars, antiterrorist and other police operations). Both rates skyrocketed in Russia in the beginning of 1990s and stayed at the extremely high levels until today. The gap between these two indicators widened during the first Chechen war allowed the timely delivery of public goods for the growing private economy. The anecdotal evidence and naked eye observations suggest that the government in China is going ahead of the private sector, whereas in Russia it is far behind. The former two are politically liberal or liberalizing, i. e. protect individual rights, including those of property and contracts, and create a framework of law and administration, while the latter regimes, though democratic, are politically not so liberal since they lack strong institutions and the ability to enforce law and order (Zakaria, 1997) . This gives rise to the phenomenon of "illiberal democracies" -countries, where competitive elections are introduced before the rule of law is established. While European countries in the XIX century and East Asian countries recently moved from first establishing the rule of law to gradually introducing democratic elections (Hong Kong is the most obvious example of the rule of law without democracy), in Latin America, Africa, and now in CIS countries democratic political systems were introduced in societies without the firm rule of law. Authoritarian regimes (including communist), while gradually building property rights and institutions, were filling the vacuum in the rule of law via authoritarian means. After democratization occurred and illiberal democracies emerged, they found themselves deprived of old authoritarian instruments to ensure law and order, but without the newly developed democratic mechanisms needed to guarantee property rights, contracts and law and order in general. No surprise, this had a devastating impact on investment climate and output.
There is a clear relationship between the ratio of rule of law index on the eve of transition to democratization index, on the one hand, and economic performance during transition, on the other. To put it differently, democratization without strong rule of law, whether one likes it or not, usually leads to the collapse of output. There is a price to pay for early democratization, i.e. introduction of competitive elections of government under the conditions when the major liberal rights (personal freedom and safety, property, contracts, fair trial in court, etc.) are not well established.
Finally, performance was of course affected by economic policy. Given the weak institutional capacity of the state, i.e. its poor ability to enforce its own regulations, economic policies could hardly be "good". Weak state institutions usually imply populist macroeconomic policies For a larger sample of countries (all developing and developed countries, not only transition economies), the result is that there is a threshold level of the rule of law index: if it is higher than a certain level, democratization affects growth positively, if lower -democratization impedes growth (Polterovich, Popov, 2006 *, **, *** -Significant at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. a Cumulative measure of distortions as a % of GDP equal to the sum of defense expenditure (minus 3% regarded as the 'normal' level), deviations in industrial structure and trade openness from the 'normal' level, the share of heavily distorted trade (among the FSU republics) and lightly distorted trade (with socialist countries) taken with a 33% weight -see (Popov, 2000) for details. b Equals 1 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Tajikistan and 0 for all other countries. c Significant at 13% level.
To test the robustness of the results, another year for the end of the transformational recession was chosen -1998, so the period considered was 1989-98 (by the end of 1998 the absolute trough was reached in 24 countries out of 26 that experienced the recession). The adjusted R 2 is slightly lower, but the statistical significance of coefficients remains high (with the exception of the initial GDP per capita). The best equation is shown below: Once again, if liberalization variable is introduced in this equation, it turns out to be insignificant.
To summarize, Chinese style gradual deregulation of prices allowed to avoid the collapse of output in non-competitive industries, whereas gradual democratization allowed to preserve strong institutions that contributed greatly to the recent Chinese economic success.
Medium term perspective (since 1949): Beijing consensus versus Washington consensus
The catch-up development of China since 1949 looks extremely impressive: not only the growth rates in China were higher than elsewhere after the reforms (1979-onward), but even before the
reforms (1949-79), despite temporary declines during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural
Revolution, the Chinese development was quite successful. According to Maddison (2003) fig. 14) , that in the late 1970s, right before the reforms, Chinese per capita GDP was only half of India's, whereas today it is nearly 2 times higher ( fig. 15 ). Life expectancy in China in 1950 was only 35 years, but by the end of the 1970s rose to 65 years -13 years higher than in India (fig. 16 ); today it is 72 years -7 years higher than in Russia and India. (Lu, 1999) . Through the party cells in every village the communist government in Beijing was able to enforce its rules and regulations all over the country more efficiently then any emperor, not to speak about Guomindang regime . While in the XIX century the central government had revenues equivalent to only 3% of GDP (against 12% in Japan right after the Meiji restoration) and under Guomindang government they increased only to 5% of GDP, Mao's government left the state coffers to the Deng's reform team with revenues equivalent to 20% of GDP. In the same period, during the "clearly the greatest experiment in the mass education in the history of the world" (UNESCO-sponsored 1984 Report) literacy rates in China increased to from 28% in 1949 to 65% by the end of the 1970s (41% in India).
The Great Leap Forward (1958-62) • Gradual democratization and the preservation of the one party rule in China allowed to avoid institutional collapse, whereas in Russia institutional capacity was adversely affected by the shock-type transition to democracy (Polterovich, Popov, 2006 ); • Gradual market reforms -"dual track price system" (co-existence of the market economy and centrally planned economy for over a decade), "growing out of socialism" (no privatization until 1996, but creation of the private sector from scratch), non-conventional forms of ownership and control (TVEs);
• Industrial policy -strong import substitution policy in 1949-78 and strong export-oriented industrial policy afterwards with such tools as tariff protectionism (in the 1980s import tariffs were as high as up to 40% of the value of import) and export subsidies (Polterovich, Popov, 2005 );
• Macroeconomic policy -not only in traditional sense (fiscal and monetary policy), but also exchange rate policy: rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in China (despite positive current and capital account) led to the undervaluation of yuan, whereas Russian ruble became overvalued in 1996-98 and more recently -in 2000-07. Undervaluation of the exchange rate via accumulation of reserves became in fact the major tool of export-oriented industrial policy (Polterovich, Popov, 2004) .
One of the principles, namely trade openness, is probably most controversial. The advocates of the liberalization would often argue that the increase in the share of exports in GDP in China from 2% in 1970 (5% in 1979) to 35% in 2005 is a proof that openness works. As usually happens, victory has many parents, whereas the defeat is always an orphan. However, as Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) argued, there are two notions of trade openness that often get confused -the liberal trade regime (no barriers to imports and exports, convertible currency) and the share of trade in GDP -and these two do not always go together. There is plenty of evidence that high and increasing share of trade in GDP is strongly correlated with economic growth and investment/GDP ratios ( fig. 17, 18 ), but there is no evidence that the higher and increasing share of trade in GDP is linked to the liberal trade policies. Fast growing and more intensively trading nations are not always and were not always more open to trade (had low tariff and non-tariff barriers) than their less globalized competitors: among countries with rapid growth of export/GDP ratios there are quite a few that maintained high import duties ( fig. 19) . For the XIX century, although detailed statistics does not exist, there are some powerful examples, suggesting that the growth-promoting nature of free trade is at best not obvious: China after the Opium Wars had to open its economy to international trade completely, but GDP per capita in 1949, when the communists took power, was at the same level as in 1850; 100 years was lost for growth despite pervasive openness (Lu, 1999) . On the contrary, initially Chinese rapid growth of the share of trade in GDP (from 2% in 1970 to 25% in 1995) was taking place under an extremely protectionist trade policy -before 1979 there was a complete state monopoly on foreign trade, and in 1979-95 there was no convertibility of yuan even on current account, whereas average import duties were above 35% (Rodrik, 2006) . Recent empirical studies (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999; O'Roerke and Williamson, 2002;  O'Roerke and Sinnoit, 2002; see for a survey: Williamson, 2002) found that there is no conclusive evidence that free trade is always good for growth: whereas protectionist countries grew more rapidly before the WWI ( fig. 20) , they exhibited lower than average growth after the WWII. 
Is Chinese growth sustainable?
There is a controversy among economists whether 10% annual Chinese growth is sustainable.
Parallels have been made between East Asian and Soviet growth. Krugman (1994) , referring to the calculations by Young (1994) , has argued that there is no puzzle to Asian growth; that it was due mostly to the accelerated accumulation of factor inputs -capital and labor, whereas TFP growth was quite weak (lower than in Western countries). The logical outcome was the prediction that East Asian growth is going to end in the same way the Soviet growth did -overaccumulation of capital resources, if continued, sooner or later would undermine capital productivity. It may have happened already in Japan in the 1970s -1990s (where growth rates declined despite the high share of investment in GDP) and may be happening in Korea, Taiwan and ASEAN countries after the currency crises of 1997. The only other alternative for high growth countries would be to reduce the rates of capital accumulation (growth of investment), which should lead to the same result -slowdown in the growth of output. Radelet and Sachs (1997) , however, challenged this view, arguing that East Asian growth is likely to resume in two to three years after the 1997 currency crises.
A different approach (based on endogenous growth models and treating investment in physical and human capital as causing increases in TFP) is that in theory rapid growth can continue endlessly, if investments in physical and human capital are high. According to this approach, all cases of "high growth failures" -from USSR to Japan -are explained by special circumstances and do not refute the theoretical possibility of maintaining high growth rates "forever". The logical "special" explanation for the Soviet economic decline is of course the nature of the centrally planned economy itself that precluded it from using investment as efficiently as in market economies (Popov, 2006) . In a market economy that operates well below the technological frontier, the rapid catch-up development can be virtually endless, if the right policies are pursued. Continuing for nearly three decades 10% annual growth in China with the share of investment in GDP approaching 50% so far supports this view.
True, the predictions of coming crash of the Chinese economic model and political system are by no means in short supply. Chang (2001) fig. 21 ), whereas the per capita number of scientists in China is a small fraction of that in South Korea and Japan ( fig. 22 ).
11 "Peer beneath the surface, and there is a weak China, one that is in long-term decline and even on the verge of collapse. The symptoms of decay are to be seen everywhere." Chang believed China has about five years to get its economy in order before it suffers a crippling financial collapse--a timeline he seriously doubted could be met.
12 "In the absence of an alternative to the vision of liberal democracy, the authoritarian Chinese ruling elite will find it no easy task to juggle all the competing demands that come its way" (Yang, 2006, p.164) . "The lack of democratic reforms in China has led to pervasive corruption and a breakdown in political accountability. What has emerged is a decentralized predatory state in which local party bosses have effectively privatized the state's authority. Collusive corruption is widespread and governance is deteriorating. Instead of evolving toward a full market economy, China is trapped in partial economic and political reforms (Pei, 2006 , cover text). However, China seems to be more successful than Korea and Japan several decades ago in terms of exports of high tech-goods -in 1992-2002 the share of these goods in total manufacturing exports increased from 6% to 23% and today is nearly as high as in Japan ( fig. 23 ), whereas in India it was still 5% in 2002. The share of IT technologies in GDP in 2002 in China was 5% as compared to 7% in Korea and 8% in Japan. It appears that with FDI China is able to upgrade its industrial structure and the structure of exports faster than Japan and Korea did in the past. The
Chinese annual inflow of FDI in 2004-05 ($50 billion) was greater than the Indian stock ($45 billion), whereas Chinese merchandise exports in 2005 was 7 times higher than India's -$762 and $105 billion respectively (Acharya, 2007) . Nevertheless, the issue of technological dependency is real and much discussed in China. Recent studies (Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2006; Rodrik, 2006) suggest that what really matters for promoting growth is not the expansion of any exports, but the ability to increase exports of high tech sophisticated goods. Controlling for the GDP per capita, the index of export sophistication turns out to be very informative for the explanation of cross-country differences in growth rates.
It is noteworthy that China had a very high difference between hypothetical level of per capita GDP (calculated on the basis of the sophistication of the structure of export) and actual level.
This difference for China was very high in 1992 and remained high in 2002, but it decreased markedly from its 1992 level. Other studies suggest that Chinese export is less skill-intensive between these three types of players. Besides, it is Beijing's stated goal to ramp up research spending to about 2.5% of GDP by 2020 from the current level of 1.3%, so the problem is at least recognized. But if something can jeopardize fast Chinese growth, it is probably the potential inability of the authorities to deal with growing technological dependency and weakness of the indigenous R&D. Other risk factors include the potential inability to arrest the increase in income inequalities and the weakening of the institutions (corruption, decline in government effectiveness), inability of the state to deliver affordable education, health care and pensions.
So far, however, despite all reservations, Chinese economic development looks extremely impressive; China is more successful in catch-up development than most developing countries;
and even if fast Chinese growth stops tomorrow, we'll only have two puzzles instead of onewe'll have to explain not only why such growth was possible before, but also why it finally came to an end.
No surprise Chinese economic model is extremely appealing in developing world. "Beijing consensus" may not yet be a rigorous term (Ramo, 2004) 
Conclusions
Why economic liberalization worked in China (1979-onwards) , but failed in other countries (Sub-Sahara Africa, Latin America, former Soviet Union)? It is argued that there are at least two explanations. First, Chinese reforms were very different from the Washington consensus package (gradual rather than instant deregulation of prices, no mass privatization, strong industrial policy, undervaluation of the exchange rate via accumulation of reserves) -it is explained why these policies contributed to success. Second, the recent Chinese success (1979-onwards) is based on the achievements of the Mao period (1949-76) -strong state institutions, efficient government and increased pool of human capital. Unlike in the former Soviet Union, these achievements were not squandered in China due to gradual rather than shock-therapy type democratization.
It follows that the successful catch up development of China, if continues, would become the turning point for the world economy not only due to the size of the country, but also because for the first time in history the successful economic development on a major scale is based on indigenous, not Western-type economic model. If this interpretation is correct, the next large regions of successful catch up development would be MENA Islamic countries and South Asia, whereas Latin America, Sub-Sahara Africa and Russia would be falling behind.
